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8QGHUVWDQGLQJ+DUULV·XQGHUVWDQGLQJRI&($LVFRVWHIIHFWLYHUHVRXUFH
allocation undone? 
 
Harris is a longstanding critic of CEA and the QALY. In this paper we attempt 
WRVXPPDULVHDQGHYDOXDWHERWK+DUULV·FULWLFLVPVRI&($DQGWKHDOWHUQDWLYH
processes he commends to health care decision makers. In contrast to CEA, 
+DUULV·asserts that individuals have a right to lifesaving treatment that cannot 
be denied by a decision maker on the basis of their ability to benefit. We 
conclude that, whilst +DUULV·work has challenged the proponents of CEA and 
4$/<VWREHH[SOLFLWDERXWWKHPHWKRG·VGLVFULPLQDWRU\FKDUDFWHULVWLFVKLV
arguments are largely based upon the flawed premise that lives can be 
saved, rather than death postponed; and that opportunity cost can be 
avoided by attempting to secure the same chance of treatment for every 
person desiring it. We further show that even if just, his suggested allocation 
(lottery) principle is unlikely to be in the interests of those who are worst off. 
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1. Introduction 
For the last 20 years and more, John Harris has been the single most vocal 
critic of the use of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) in health care resource 
allocation and quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) in particular. As austerity 
bites and the attraction of methods that claim to support fair and transparent 
resource allocation inevitably increases, it is WLPHO\WRFRQVLGHU+DUULV·
arguments whilst the opportunity remains to identify alternative methods for 
informing health policy. 
 
This paper summarises and evaluates ERWK+DUULV·FULWLFLVPVRI&($DQGWKH
alternative processes he commends to health care decision makers. Section 
FRQVLGHUV+DUULV·GHILQLWLRQRIDOLIHVDYHGWKHQ6HFWLRQDGGUHVVHVWKH
MXVWLFHRI+DUULV·FODLPVEHKLQGWKHYHLORILJQRUDQFH6HFtion 4 addresses 
+DUULV·SURSRVDOVIRUWKHUROHRIFRVWVEHIRUH6HFWLRQH[DPLQHVWKH
alternative resource allocation procedures that he advocates. The paper 
concludes E\VXPPDULVLQJWKHNH\WKHPHVLQ+DUULV·UHMHFWLRQVRI&($DQG
asking whether their use by resource allocation bodies such as NICE can be 
defended. 
 
2. What is a life saved? 
CEA assumes that the aim of health policy is to maximise population health. 
In its most common formulation, CEA measures health using QALYs in order to 
capture the impact of both life persevering and life enhancing treatments.1 
Here, techniques are used to measure health-related quality of life on a scale 
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where zero represents a state deemed (by a respondent) as bad as being 
dead and one represents a state deemed as equivalent to being in full 
health.2 If being dead and being in full health can be said to be equally 
important for all individuals, then the QALY, in theory at least, can measure 
health in a way that is comparable between individuals. Further, since QALYs 
can be formed for any conceivable health treatment, they allow the health 
benefits from all treatments to be compared. 
 
In contrast to this, when critiquing the QALY Harris normally posits situations 
where there is an imminent risk of death to at least one party, with those at 
risk identified as being in need of health care resources and those not at risk 
identified as being in lesser (or no) need. In essence, health is simplified and 
patients are simply alive or dead an unspecified point in time following 
treatment or non-treatment (depending on the choices made). Ultimately 
though, everyone dies and once dead their life is no longer saved, even if this 
could have been said at one time; it is perhaps more meaningful to talk of 
delaying death. 
 
However, this raises the question of how long a pulse must be maintained to 
count as having saved a life, with Harris deeming even a few hours important 
to allow an individual to potentially ´settle their affairsµ.3 Many lives can be 
extended beyond a few hours and justice may require that we make a 
distinction. If so, Cubbon·VFULWLTXHDSSOLHVLIZHXVHOLYHVVDYHGDVWKH
PHDVXUHRIEHQHILWRQH´VKRXOGVWULYHWRVDYHWKHOLIHRIDEDE\ZKRRQO\FDQ
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live another hour of acute suffering just as much as one who will have a 
hapS\DQGIUXLWIXOH[LVWHQFHRIWKUHHVFRUH\HDUVDQGWHQµ4 In addition to this 
argument, it is also worth noting that were a health care system to measure 
its success by those lives it has saved, then the baby who will live for 70 years 
will represent a success to that system for longer. Thus, even a health system 
that would focus on saving lives in the short run might still prioritise treating 
those with greater life expectancies. 
 
+DUULV·WUHDWPHQWDOVRUDLVHVDVHFRQGTXHVWLRQhow imminently must a life be 
in jeopardy for it to be deemed ´VDYHGµ":KLOVWKLVH[DPSOHVGHDOZLWK
imminent death, death is not typically instantaneous in the event that 
treatment is not received. +HUHHLWKHU+DUULV·SRVLWLRQGHDOVRQO\ZLWKDWLQ\
QXPEHURI´UXOHRIUHVFXHµFDVHs, and so has nothing to say in the vast 
majority of places where QALYs are used, or it can be generalised. Assuming 
the latter, we consider what this generalisation may involve. As we consider 
longer intervals for the risk of death, then it becomes increasingly difficult to 
justify a position that groups would have equal claims on treatments that 
´VDYHµWKHLUOLYHVDOD+DUULV Clearly, extending the life of a person who may 
die five years from now and one who would die tomorrow may be different in 
terms of MXVWLFHEXWHDFKLVD´OLIHVDYHGµLIQRGLVWLQFWLRQLVPDGHbetween 
them. However, if a fixed time limit is placed on when jeopardy must occur, 
there are inevitably uncomfortable distinctions of what does and does not 
constitute life saving. More importantly, any limit on when jeopardy occurs 
means that Harris places lexically greater priority on some life preserving 
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treatments defined as life saving than on both life enhancing and other life 
preserving treatments not defined as life saving ² and absolute limits on 
ZKLFKOLIHSUHVHUYLQJWUHDWPHQWV´FRXQWµDSSHDUDUELWUDU\ 
 
Harris has claimed WKDW´>RQO\@ when all demands on resources for life saving 
KDYHEHHQPHWVKRXOGOLIHHQKDQFHPHQWVEHXQGHUWDNHQµDQGWKDW´OLIH
saving procedures are usually to be preferred to life enhancing procedures, 
SUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHRIWKHPDJQLWXGHRIWKHEHQHILWµ5,6 Elsewhere, Harris 
acknowledges a relationship between life enhancing treatments and the 
SURWHFWLRQRIOLIHHJWKURXJKVFUHHQLQJSUHYHQWLRQDQG´ILUVWOLQHµ
treatments of disease.7 He recognises the complexity of the choices to be 
made and that decision makers considering these issues would need to 
consider issues such as pain, distress and mobility; thus he accepts the moral 
legitimacy of considering life enhancing aspects of health care. However, he 
rejects the QALY, in part because it incorporates life expectancy. As we 
explain above, this rejection of life expectancy flows from the fact that he 
only considers outcomes at a single point in time (e.g. life saved/life not 
saved) without fully exploring issues of timing. Once these timing issues are 
considered, then any objection to the use of duration is significantly 
weakened. 
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3. Justice, efficiency and Harris 
Rawls proposed that justice could be discovered if people could be divorced 
from their own self-interest.8 To do this, he suggested D´YHLORILJQRUDQFHµDV
a hypothetical device that would prevent those looking from within from 
seeing any aspect at all of their own society, or whether or not they are rich 
or poor within that society. Within such a veil he proposed firstly that society 
should be organised so that each individual has access to the most extensive 
scheme of liberties that allows the same liberties to be available to all. Given 
this, he suggested that primary goods ² ¶WKRVHWKLQJVZKLFKDUDWLRQDOPDQ
ZDQWVZKDWHYHUHOVHKHZDQWV·² would then be allocated such that 
inequalities only ever arise if they work to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged in society. 
 
8VLQJ¶5DZOVLDQ·UHDVRQLQJ+Drris suggests that QALY maximisation would not 
be selected from within a veil of ignorance because it would represent too 
large a risk should they be old/unhealthy once the veil is lifted. 7,9-10 However, 
WKLVDSSOLFDWLRQRI5DZOV·YHLOWRKHDOWKLVSUREOHmatic since Rawls himself 
excluded health from consideration, alongside other important quantities 
such as vigour, intelligence, and imagination. That is, Rawls did not consider 
health to be something that could be directly distributed in the way that 
wealth can be within the veil of ignorance. Hence, Rawls ignored 
mechanisms that would explicitly redistribute resources to have this effect. 
Thus, that 5DZOV·YHLOZRXOGQRWUHSURGXFH4$/<PD[LPLVDWLRQLVXQVXUSULVLQJ
as its first principles implicitly preclude it reaching this conclusion. As the 
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VSHFLILFVRI5DZOV·YHLOZHUHSDLQVWDNLQJO\EXLOWXSEDVHGRQILUVWSULQFLSOHV
LQFOXGLQJKHDOWKDQGRWKHU¶QDWXUDOSULPDU\JRRGV·PD\IXQGDPHQWDOO\DIIHFW
the final veil; LWQRWSRVVLEOHWRXQFULWLFDOO\´DSSO\µ5DZOV to a health setting. 
 
Other types of veils can be applied to health and lead to different 
conclusions, with Harsanyi using a veil concept to argue for the maximisation 
of utility.11,12 In his veil, all people within a defined and visible society are 
asked to choose how to decide when unable to perceive their own role and 
so also the personal impact of each option faced on them. In a lengthy 
exchange, Harris debated Singer and others, who advocated the use of a 
XWLOLWDULDQYHLOLQSUHIHUHQFHWR+DUULV·QHR-Rawlsian version.13-18 Within this 
debate, a series of examples are used with both sides more or less 
entrenched. 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that these veils produce different recommendations. 
6LQJHU·VXWLOLWDULDQYHLOVHHNVDGLVWULEXWLYHSULQFLSOHZKLOVW+DUULV·DLPHGIRUD
just answer.  As veils of ignorance aiming to answer different questions will 
naturally produce different results, both results may be equally appropriate 
but still have conflicting conclusions.  This extends to the conflict in the 
information used: even if some information is not considered relevant for 
justice, it might still be considered relevant for efficiency purposes+DUULV·
argument that resource allocation decisions should avoid certain types of 
information requires not only that his formulation of a just solution is correct 
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but also that no other criterion is necessary in decision making, since any 
additional criteria may require this information.  
 
In practice, resource allocation occurs in a context in which both efficiency 
and justice exert some pressure but neither is likely to be definitive in 
isolation.19-20 Those reimbursement authorities that use QALYs to inform their 
decisions frequently explain departures from QALY maximisation by reference 
to social values and considerations of equity; for example the National 
Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence has identified social value 
judgements that it takes into account alongside the Incremental Cost 
Effectiveness Ratio.21 
 
 
4. Consideration of costs in health care resource allocation 
Although Harris makes relatively few statements about the role of costs in 
processes that utilise CEA to allocate health care resources, he highlights two 
particular issues; first, that the cost of a technology will influence the likelihood 
that an individual will receive the treatment; second that, by extension, the 
use of CEA discriminates against those patients whose conditions are 
relatively expensive to treat.5 
 
The first consideration, whilst true under certain conditions, is far from the 
whole truth. Within the CEA framework, the impact of treatment cost on the 
OLNHOLKRRGRIDFFHVVLVGHSHQGHQWXSRQWKHWUHDWPHQW·VHIIHFWLYHQHVV9HU\
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high cost treatments that produce large health gains will be highly cost 
effective; i.e. have a lower incremental cost effectiveness ratio; and low cost 
treatments that have produce little or no health gain will be highly cost 
ineffective. +DUULV·VHFRQGFRQFHUQ maintains the mistake of the first, in 
considering cost independent of effect. He exacerbates this by failing to 
understand that in a fixed budget system ² the only type of system that has 
the type of resource allocation problem that CEA can address ² the cost for 
one person is health gain foregone for another. In this context paying more 
for a given amount of health for one person compared to another person is 
discriminatory. Thus, providing treatment for those whose condition is 
relatively expensive to treat may be more discriminatory than not providing it. 
 
+DUULV·FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHUROHRIFRVWin resource allocation decisions is 
hampered by his failure to look at the impact of costs on the choices 
available to a health care system. CEA, by linking health expenditures and 
health gains, allows the explicit balancing of different claims on a limited 
health care budget. This critique is not novel but bears repetition;22-23 
particularly as we show that his preferred alternative system may 
disadvantage the worst off with respect to health. 
 
 
5. +DUULV·WUHDWPHQWORWWHU\ 
Harris considers resource allocation in the context of life-saving treatments. 
Over the last two decades he has considered a number of candidate rubrics 
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for resource allocation; with common themes being the exclusion of 
preferences over quality of life, of the size of health benefits, and of the 
probability that health benefits will occur. Whilst he has occasionally 
advocated maximising the number of lives saved,5,24 the main alternative to 
CEA he has proposed is a lottery for treatment. 
 
Harris proposes that a just society would give each person at risk of losing their 
life an equal chance of benefiting from treatment.7,17,25 Thus a lottery is 
considered where there are multiple potential beneficiaries and insufficient 
resources to provide treatment to them all. Harris asserts potentially the most 
important feature of a lottery is that LW´YDOXHVHDFKSHUVRQDWRQHDQGQRQH
DWPRUHWKDQRQHµ7 
 
$QXPEHURIFRPPHQWDWRUVKDYHGLVDJUHHGZLWK+DUULV·YLHZRIORWWHULHV, with 
critiques echoing those in Sections 2-4 above. Potentially the most telling 
critique is provided by Williams, who DUJXHVWKDW+DUULV·IDLOXUHWRSURSHUO\
specify his lottery allows him to avoid many important issues that would 
determine whether and to what degree a lottery was a moral process.26  
´ORWWHULHVGRQRWVSULQJIXOO\formed from Heaven. They are invented by 
people. These people have to decide who is eligible to enter this lottery, 
what the prizes are, how soon and how often you can re-enter the 
ORWWHU\LI\RXIDLOWRZLQWKHILUVWWLPHZKHWKHU¶WLFNHWV·HVSHFLDOO\ZLnning 
tickets) can be traded or given away, and so on. It seems to me the 
beginning of a new discussion about discrimination, which merely takes 
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the place of the old one, but does not get us off that particular ethical 
KRRNµ 
 
We would add a further critiTXHRI+DUULV·SRVLWLRQ,IWKHEXGJHWIRUKHDOWK
care is fixed then unless the costs of all treatments are equal or the lottery 
identifies only one individual out of the patient population to benefit, an 
LQGLYLGXDO·VFKDQFHRIUHFHLYLQJKHDOWKFDUHLVDIunction not just of how 
many tickets they have in the draw but also how much of the available 
budget has been consumed in treating previous lottery winners. 
 
Suppose, for simplicity, that there are only five possible recipients for life 
saving treatments. The costs to treat individuals A, B, C, D and E are £100, 
£100, £200, £500 and £1000. Suppose that each person benefits by the same 
amount and there is a fixed budget of £1200. Clearly, if E is selected first then 
either C by itself or both A and B are affordable, with D never affordable. In 
these cases A and B have twice the chance of getting treatment, as both will 
be funded if either A or B are drawn before C. Overall, in an unjust lottery 
draw in which the money is spent until no more can be afforded for anyone 
left in the lottery, A and B are both funded 87.5% of the time, with C, D and E 
funded 72.5%, 60% and 40% of the time, respectively.  
 
Variation in cost of treatment and a fixed budget means that we cannot 
expect a lottery to deliver an equal opportunity of being treated to all 
individuals who could benefit from treatment. The only way that all five 
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recipients could receive the same chance of treatment in the example 
above is if only the first person drawn receives treatment, since the budget 
will DOZD\VEHDEOHWRDIIRUGRQHSHUVRQ·VWUHDWPHQWEXWLVQRWDOZD\VDEOHWR
afford the first two people drawn (where D and E are drawn first). In this case, 
+DUULV·MXVWRXWFRPHJLYHVDOOSHRSOHDFKDQFHRIUHFHLYLQJWUHDWPHQW
an outcome which is poorer even for the person whom it is most expensive to 
treat. In contrast, the cost-effective outcome would provide treatment to A, 
B, C and D 100% of the time. Overall, cost-effectiveness outcome provides 
(potentially lifesaving) treatment to 4 people, the unjust lottery provides it to 
SHRSOHRQDYHUDJHDQG+DUULV·MXVWORWWHU\WRRQO\SHUVRQ (see Table 1). 
Given the choice behind a veil of ignorance, some may prefer the lottery to 
the cost-effective choice but it seems unlikely that even Rawls would choose 
+DUULV·´MXVWµHTXDO-chance lottery as it violates his difference principle (at 
least within our example). 
Table 1 about here 
 
Harris also suggests a possible variant of the lottery in which all individuals 
must be given an equal chance of the greatest possible health available to 
them.24 Here, Harris appears to extend his measure of effect for health from 
life-VDYLQJWR´IORXULVKLQJµSUHVXPDEO\UHFRJQLVLQJWKHYDOXHRILPSURYHPHQWV
in quality of life as well as duration of life. However, the critiques of the lottery 
for life saving treatment outlined above apply equally to this proposal, so that 
a lottery cannot be expected to deliver an equal chance of treatment to all 
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without sacrificing some (and in some cases a large) chance of treatment to 
each person. 
 
+DUULV·SURSRVDOVIRUDMXVWV\VWHPRIUHVRXUFHDOORFDWLRQHYHQZLWKWKHOLPLWHG
detail he provides, can be shown not to be practical and, indeed, to be less 
just than some close alternatives. Whilst alternatives potentially exist to strictly-
applied CEA which may be considered preferable in terms of justice, it is 
questionable whether his specific proposals are more just than the system he 
has consistently criticised and strives to replace. 
 
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
Harris has been a vocal critic oI&($DQGWKH4$/<IRURYHU\HDUV+DUULV·
basic position is that all health benefits are indivisible and, unless a strong 
argument can be made, of equal worth. In particular, Harris suggests that life 
saving treatments dominate life enhancing treatments in all circumstances, 
regardless of the QALY benefits in either case. Harris states that all individuals 
have a right to treatment that cannot be denied by a decision maker on the 
basis of their ability to benefit. 
 
Harris has recommended slightly different methods of allocation: a lottery; 
that each individual is provided with the same chance of obtaining life 
saving treatment or the same chance of obtaining the greatest possible 
health benefit to them; and the maximisation of lives saved. Of these, the first 
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two options may lead to large numbers of avoidable deaths, which is 
precisely the outcome he seeks to avoid in his third method. Whilst Harris has 
argued previously in terms that would seem to argue against the 
maximisation of lives saved, this appears to be the least problematic version 
RIKLVVXJJHVWLRQV(YHQKHUHH[WHQGLQJRQHSHUVRQ·VOLIHIRURQHGD\ZRXOG
be counted as a larger benefit than any quality of life improvement, 
regardless of how large it is and how many people benefit. Given both the 
costs of some last-chance therapies, and the incentives signalled to 
manufacturers of making it known that treatments would be paid for at any 
FRVWWKHORQJWHUPLPSDFWRID´OLIHVDYLQJµ1+6LVXQOLNHO\WREHRQHZKHUH
much, if any, money is left to eQKDQFHDVRSSRVHWR´VDYHµOLIH 
 
+DUULV·FULWLTXHVRIWKHXVHRI&($DQG4$/<VIRUUHVRXUFHDOORFDWLRQKDYH
challenged their proponents to be explicit about the methods·GLVFULPLQDWRU\
characteristics and have thus contributed to an improved understanding 
within policy and academic communities of their strengths and weaknesses. 
7KLVVDLG+DUULV·DUJXPHQWVDJDLQVW4$/<VDQG&($DUHODUJHO\EDVHGXSRQ
flawed assumptions; first that lives can be saved, rather than deaths 
postponed; and second that the limits imposed by the opportunity cost of 
providing treatment within a fixed budget can be sidestepped by trying to 
obtain the same chance of treatment for everyone. His arguments for 
abandoning CEA and QALYs do not survive the recognition of these two 
regrettable realities.
16 
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